Demand Reduction and Preemptive Bidding inMulti-Unit License Auctions by Goeree, Jacob K et al.
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics 
University of Zurich 
 
Working Paper Series 
ISSN 1424-0459 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 430 
Demand Reduction and Preemptive Bidding in  
Multi-Unit License Auctions 
Jacob K. Goeree, Theo Offerman and Randolph Sloof 
September 2009 
 
 
Demand Reduction and Preemptive Bidding
in Multi-Unit License Auctions
Jacob K. Goeree, Theo Offerman, and Randolph Sloof∗
August 20, 2009
Abstract
Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce
their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for pre-
emptive bidding by incumbent bidders in a coordinated attempt to exclude entrants from
the market. We consider an environment where both demand reduction and preemptive
bidding are supported as equilibrium phenomena of the ascending auction. In a series of
experiments, we compare its performance to that of the discriminatory auction. Strategic
demand reduction is quite prevalent in the ascending auction even when entry imposes a
(large) negative externality on incumbents. As a result, the ascending auction performs
worse than the discriminatory auction both in terms of revenue and efficiency, while en-
trants.chances are similar across the two formats.
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1 Introduction
Following the successful US spectrum auctions in 1994, highly valuable public assets around the
world are now assigned by auction. Gas stations, airport slots, phone numbers, and telecommu-
nication frequencies have been put up for bid, mostly using some variant of the open ascending
auction. However, despite their popularity, open ascending auctions are known to be vulnerable
to collusion, sometimes allowing bidders to split the market at low prices.1 Before the 2001
Austrian UMTS auction, for example, the largest incumbent, Telekom Austria, announced it
... would be satised with just two out of the twelve blocks for o¤er and if the [ve] other
bidders behaved similarly, it should be possible to get the frequencies on sensible terms ... but
that it would bid on a third block if one of its rivals did...Other bidders understood the hint
and bidding stopped after a couple of rounds at low prices with each bidder obtaining just two
blocks (Klemperer 2004, p. 136). Several papers have demonstrated that this type of demand
reduction can be supported in an equilibrium of the sealed-bid uniform-price auctions, see, e.g.,
Noussair (1995), Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998), and Ausubel and Cramton (1998). As
Ausubel and Cramton (1998) note, such a result can usually be adapted to apply for the open
ascending auction.2
Incentives for demand reduction are likely a¤ected when incumbents compete with possible
entrants for a xed number of market licenses. Entrants typically impose a negative exter-
nality on incumbents in the ensuing product market and in an attempt to keep the entrants
out, incumbents may engage in predatory biddingand drive up license prices beyond their
economic values. Open ascending auctions are particularly conducive to predatory bidding as
they allow incumbents to coordinate their attempts to keep an entrant out. One example of
successful preemptive bidding occurred in the US C&F spectrum auction. After round 14, only
1For instance, in his analysis of bidding behavior in the FCCs AB-block auction, Weber (1997) nds evidence
that the large bidders dropped out of some markets at prices far below market expectations. See also Cramton
and Schwartz (2000).
2Demand reduction has also been observed in the laboratory. Alsemgeest, Noussair, and Olson (1998), for
instance, compare the open ascending auction to a sealed-bid auction where the price for each unit equals the
lowest accepted bid. They nd evidence for demand reduction in the open ascending auction, which generally
yields lower revenues than the sealed-bid format. Kagel and Levin (2001) consider environments without
strategic uncertainty where a single human bidder competes against robot bidders in a sealed-bid uniform-price
auction, an open ascending auction, and the Vickrey/Ausubel auction. Demand reduction occurs in both the
sealed-bid uniform-price and the open ascending auction, but the level of demand reduction is more pronounced
in the latter. Kagel and Levin (2005) obtain a similar nding for a setting where the single human bidder
faces a tradeo¤ between bidding above value due to synergies and demand reduction. Engelmann and Grimm
(2009) compare ve auction formats: the sealed-bid uniform-price, the open ascending, the discriminatory, the
Vickrey, and the Ausubel auction. They observe more demand reduction in the open ascending auction than in
the sealed-bid uniform-price auction. Finally, List and Lucking-Reiley (2000) conduct a eld experiment with
sports cards and nd evidence for demand reduction in the sealed-bid uniform-price auction, although revenues
do not di¤er from those of a Vickrey auction because bidders bid too high on the rst unit. Pooling the results
of these di¤erent studies suggests that demand reduction is more pronounced in open ascending auctions than
in sealed-bid uniform-price auctions.
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Verizon, Cingular, and AT&T were competing for the three available licenses in New York. At
this point prices were $782 million but Verizon continued to bid for two licenses until Cingular
dropped out, resulting in license prices in excess of $2 billion (Cramton 2002).3
When both incumbent and entrant bidders are present, a revenue-maximizing seller thus
has to gauge the likelihood of demand reduction versus preemptive bidding in the open as-
cending auction.4 The drawing power of either equilibrium is essentially an empirical issue,
which is complicated by the existence of cheap preemptive equilibria.In such an equilibrium,
incumbents rst try to keep entrants out of the market but when preemption turns out to
be rather costly they reduce demand and split the market at an intermediate price level. In
the German UMTS auction, for instance, Deutsche Telekom, one of the incumbents, continued
pushing up the price when the market could be split among the six active bidders but it later
ended the auction before any of its competitors had conceded, paying an extra $2 billion for
the two blocks it could have acquired before. This sequence of events surprised many and
some even interpreted it as evidence of irrational behavior by Deutsche Telekom.5 Ewerhart
and Moldovanu (2001) show, however, that preemption followed by demand reduction can be
rationalized as equilibrium behavior.6
This paper presents the rst experimental study of the impact of negative externalities on
outcomes of the open ascending auction. In this auction, the auctioneer steadily raises the
price for the goods for sale and the bidders decide at what prices they want to reduce demand.
A bidders decision to reduce demand is irrevocable and observed by the other bidders. The
auction stops when demand equals supply. For brevity we will simply refer to this auction
as the ascending auction. In the environment we consider, two incumbents compete with one
entrant for six identical licenses. We assume bidders have at demands for the licenses o¤ered,
i.e. a bidders independent private value applies to each license bought. Every bidder can buy
at most three licenses and if the entrant acquires one or more licenses, both incumbents incur a
negative externality (even when an incumbent buys no license). Hence, the only way to avoid
the negative externality is for the incumbents to each buy three licenses and keep the entrant
out of the market. We consider three di¤erent regimes: no externality, a weak externality, and
a strong externality.
We prove there exists a continuum of cheap preemptive equilibriain all three regimes 
ranging from a puredemand reduction equilibrium to a purepreemptive equilibrium. We
3See Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1996, 1999), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) and Das Varma (2002,
2003) for a theoretical analysis of bidding behavior in the presence of externalities.
4A similar evaluation has to be made by a seller interested in maximizing e¢ ciency or entry.
5Klemperer (2004, p. 159, footnote 27) compares Deutsche Telekoms behavior to that of someone who waits
in a queue for a long time but then quits in frustration before it is his turn.
6Klemperer (2004, p. 202) criticizes the assumption made by Ewerhart and Moldovanu (2001) that there is
only a single strong bidder; their model cannot explain why initially both Deutsche Telekom and Mannesman
pushed up the price but then stopped doing so.
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thus extend the analysis of Ewerhart and Moldovanu (2001) beyond the particular setting of
the German UMTS auction and show that preemptive bidding followed by demand reduction
can occur more generally, e.g. with multiple symmetric incumbent bidders. Our experimental
setting is conducive to any of these equilibria, all of which prescribe identical strategies to
players of the same type. Intuitively, one might expect that demand reduction becomes less
focal when the negative externality becomes stronger. Our experiment provides a controlled
way to evaluate this conjecture empirically.
The equilibrium-selection issue present in ascending auctions translates into large uncer-
tainty about revenues. This may explain why some high-stakes license auctions employ a
simpler sealed-bid format where high bidders pay their own bids. In some instances, such dis-
criminatory auctions have performed remarkably well. For example, in the Brazilian auction for
wireless telephone services, a consortium including BellSouth and Splice do Brazil submitted
the winning bid of $2.45 billion for the license covering Sao Paulo. This bid was 60% higher
than the second highest bid, i.e. about $1 billion was left on the table (Milgrom 2004, p. 17).
In another instance, Spains biggest bank BSCH won the Sao Paulo state bank Banespa for
a bid of $3.6 billion. To the embarassment of the managers of the Spanish bank, the second
highest bid was only $1.1 billion, leaving $2.5 billion on the table (Klemperer 2004, p. 136).
While these examples are somewhat extreme, they show that the discriminatory auction may
outperform the ascending auction in terms of revenues.
Our experiments also compare the ascending auction to the discriminatory auction.7 Dis-
criminatory auctions do not support demand reduction in equilibrium. Moreover, preemptive
bidding plays less of a role in that entrants have better chances than in the preemptive equilib-
rium of the ascending auction. A comparison of the performance of the two formats thus hinges
on the type of equilibrium selected in the ascending auction. Our experimental results indicate
that demand reduction occurs even when incumbentsincentives are to keep the entrant out of
the market. In particular, while the presence of a negative externality makes strategic demand
reduction less focal in the ascending auctions, it is always more prevalent than preemptive
bidding. Because demand reduction is so wide-spread, the ascending auction is outperformed
by the discriminatory auction in terms of revenue and e¢ ciency while entry levels are similar.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the auction formats,
the experimental design, and procedures. Section 3 presents the theoretical analysis for our
setup. In Section 4 we discuss the experimental results. Section 5 concludes.
7We chose to focus attention to the two auction formats that are most often observed in practice. The
optimal format is unknown for our setting, see Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1999).
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2 Experimental design
The experiment was computerized. Subjects started with on-screen instructions. They also
received a summary of the instructions on paper (see Appendix A). The actual experiment
consisted of two parts. Part 1 started with a practice period followed by 15 periods. Part 2
consisted of 1 period only. Subjects received instructions for the second part only after the rst
part was completed. They earned points in each (real) period of the experiment, which were
exchanged at the end of the experiment at a rate of 1 euro for 80 points. Table 1 summarizes
the details of the 6 treatments. Each subject participated in one treatment only.
The setup of our experiment is roughly consistent with the actual German UMTS license
auction, where 12 blocks of spectrum were put up for sale from which bidders could create
licenses of either 2 or 3 blocks, so that the market would be split between 6 or 4 rms, re-
spectively. Basically, we consider a scaled down version of the German UMTS auction. In
our experiment, 6 identical goods were sold to 3 bidders. Each bidder could buy at most 3
goods so that the market could be split between 2 or 3 bidders. Restrictions on the number of
licenses are common in licence auctions, because they help to prevent the creation of an excess
of market power.
Subjects were assigned to the same group of 3 bidders throughout the whole rst part. In
each period, 6 identical goods were sold to the 3 subjects of a group. Subjects submitted bids
in accordance with the auction rules of the treatment and at the end of each period the goods
were assigned to the winning bidders.
At the start of each period, each subject received one integer private value from the U [0; 100]
distribution, which was valid for each of the 6 goods being o¤ered for sale. Subjects derived a
constant marginal payo¤ equal to their private value for each good bought. This feature of the
design is roughly consistent with the practice of license auctions. Klemperer (2002) concludes
from the bidding in the UK UMTS auctions that most bidders value large licenses consisting
of 3 blocks more than small licenses of 2 blocks. We chose constant marginal costs to keep the
design and the instructions simple and we leave it to future work to investigate other interesting
cases, for instance the one where marginal costs decrease. Subjects were only informed about
their own private value and private value draws were independent across subjects and periods.
All these rules were common knowledge. We kept the private value draws constant across
treatments. Thus, di¤erences between treatments cannot be attributed to di¤erences in draws.
We used three levels of the negative external e¤ect: x = 0, x = 50 and x = 100. The
external e¤ect was kept constant within a treatment. Each subject was assigned a xed role
that she kept during the whole experiment. For the treatments with x = 0 subjects were
assigned to symmetricroles of Types A, B and C. In the treatments with x > 0, Types A
and B represented the incumbents and Type X represented the entrant. Each bidder received
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a prot on purchases equal to the number of goods bought times the bidders private value
minus the sum of the prices paid for the goods. Type Xs prots were entirely determined by
the prot margins on the goods bought. Types A and B knew that if Type X would buy 1, 2
or 3 goods, an amount of 50 (100) points would be subtracted from their prots on purchases
when x = 50 (x = 100). The negative external e¤ect was also inicted upon an incumbent
when she did not buy any good herself. So there was no escape from an external e¤ect once it
occurred. The only possibility to prevent the negative external e¤ect was to keep the entrant
completely out of the market.
Our modeling of the external e¤ect was based on the idea that in most license auctions
winners engage in a form of Bertrand competition in the aftermarket. With pure Bertrand
competition, theory predicts that the price-level is not dependent on the number of competi-
tors. This prediction seems at odds with real-life observations and it is indeed rejected in an
experimental study by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000). They nd that in groups of 3 or 4 com-
petitors, winning price bids converged rather rapidly to the marginal cost. With 2 competitors
prices remained much higher than the marginal costs. Dufwenberg and Gneezy o¤er an expla-
nation based on bounded rationality. If with some small probability any rm prices di¤erently
from the Bertrand prediction, then the predictions will depend on the number of competitors.
Thus, with 3 competitors in the aftermarket, lower prices and prots will result compared to
the case where the entrant is successfully kept out of the market by the incumbents. With
Bertrand competition, a newcomer may drive down consumer prices to the competitive level
independent of the number of licenses it acquires. Consistent with this possibility, we chose
the external e¤ect to be independent of the number of licenses acquired by the entrant in our
reduced form model. An alternative justication of a negative external e¤ect of the newcomer
on the incumbent is provided by Spulber (1995), who shows that an increase in competition
should result in lower prices in an extended Bertrand model where competitors possess private
information about marginal costs. Abbink and Brandts (2005) provide experimental support
for the main prediction of that model.
Notice that subjects in the treatments with x > 0 could easily lose money in some periods
because of the external e¤ect. Therefore, we provided subjects with a starting capital that
they did not have to pay back after the experiment. The starting capital in treatments x = 0,
x = 50 and x = 100 equalled 200, 750 and 1500 points, respectively, for incumbents as well
as for entrants. Subjects knew that if they nished the experiment with a negative balance
they would go home without any money. It never happened that a subjects balance actually
became negative. The case of x = 100 represents a substantive negative external e¤ect because
incumbents in the discriminatory auction would actually make an average loss of 9.9 points per
period if they played according to the Nash equilibrium.
Part 2 lasted for just a single period. To cover potential losses in this part, at the beginning
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of part 2 subjects received an additional bonus of 500 (1000) points in the treatments with
x = 50 (x = 100). The only di¤erence between a period of part 1 and the period of part 2 was
that the payo¤ in part 2 was automatically multiplied by 10. Subjects thus played for much
more money in the period of part 2. For statistical reasons we kept the group compositions the
same as in part 1. We did not inform subjects about this aspect and none of them asked about
it. The auction format and the level of the external e¤ect were kept constant across parts.
In the ascending auctions, bidders rst simultaneously submitted their initially demanded
quantity. This initial demand represented the number of goods on which they wanted to start
bidding. It had to be an integer number from the set f0; 1; 2; 3g. When the sum of initial
demands within a group was less than or equal to 6, the period ended immediately and all
bidders received their requested goods at a price of zero.8 In case the sum of initial demands
was greater than 6, a thermometer (or clock) started rising point-by-point from 0 points onwards
at a pace of 1 point per second. The thermometers temperatureshowed the price level that all
active bidders were prepared to pay for the number of goods that they still demanded. Bidders
could reduce their demand at any price level. The thermometer continued to rise until a price
level was reached where total demand was equal to 6. This was the price that each bidder had
to pay for all the goods assigned to her in accordance with her quantity demanded.
When the thermometer started rising, each bidder was and remained completely informed
about each of the demanded quantities of the other two bidders. In case one of the bidders de-
creased her demand, the thermometer halted for four seconds to give the bidders the possibility
to process the information. Bidders were not able to increase their demand within a period.
They only had the possibility to reduce demand by 1, 2 or 3 units at a time, as long as this
would not decrease total demand below 6. So like in actual license auctions, bidders could not
increase their activity during the auction and they could also not withdraw bids that belonged
to the provisionally winning bids. The computer kept track of how much a bidder could reduce
her demanded quantity. At the end of a period bidders were informed about their own earnings
but not about the earnings of others.
In the discriminatory auctions, bidders simultaneously submitted three (integer) bids. They
also had the possibility to bid on fewer than 3 goods.9 All the bids in a group were ordered
and the 6 goods were assigned to the 6 highest bids.10 The bidder who submitted a highest bid
8In accordance with the usual practice of license auctions, we did not use reserve prices in either auction
format. In the recent 3G auctions, most countries refrained from setting a reserve price (Netherlands) or they set
very low reserve prices (e.g., Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy). As Klemperer (2003) notes, [But] serious
reserve prices are often unpopular with politicians and bureaucrats who even if they have the information to
set them sensiblyare often reluctant to run even a tiny risk of not selling the objects, which outcome they fear
would be seen as a failure.
9In all treatments, we had a lower bound of 0 on subjectsbids. In the treatments with x = 0, x = 50 and
x = 100 the upper limit of subjectsbids was equal to respectively 100, 125 and 150. The upper limit was never
reached in the experiments.
10Notice that in both auctions there was a possibility that some goods remained unsold in a period. In the
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bought the good at a price equal to the amount bid. In case of tied bids the bids were ordered
on the basis of a lottery. At the end of a period bidders were informed about the number of
goods that they bought, the price that they paid, whether the entrant entered (if applicable)
and their own earnings but they were not informed about the earnings of others.
In total we recruited 144 subjects from the student population of the University of Amster-
dam. The subjects were equally divided over the 6 treatments, so we obtained per treatment
data on 8 independent groups of 3 subjects each. The experiment lasted for about one and
a half hours. Subjects earned on average 30:80 euros with a minimum of 5:10 euros and a
maximum of 80:30 euros. Subjects in the role of entrant earned with an average of 42:95 euros
more than subjects in the role of incumbent with an average of 26:60 euros.
3 Equilibrium predictions
In section 3.1 we discuss, for the environment described above, the demand-reduction and
(cheap) preemptive equilibrium outcomes for the ascending auction. In section 3.2 we discuss
the preemptive equilibrium for the discriminatory auction. For ease of exposition we consider
bidder values that are uniformly distributed on [0,1] rather than on [0,100], i.e. we choose
dollar units rather than pennies so that values and bids are scaled by 1/100. Consequently, the
external e¤ect used in the experiment is x = 0, x = 1
2
, and x = 1.
3.1 Ascending auction
Because of its dynamic nature, the relevant solution concept for the ascending auction is the
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), which species a strategy prole and a set of beliefs such
that strategies are optimal given beliefs and beliefs are consistent, i.e. they follow from
Bayes rule where applicable. As usual this leaves some room for the specication of o¤-
the-equilibrium-path beliefs, but once a deviation occurs, subsequent play again has to follow
the logic of sequential rationality dictated by PBE. Below we show that there are multiple
belief/strategy systems that form a PBE of the ascending auction, some that involve demand
reduction and others that involve preemptive behavior and some that involve both.
First, consider for the symmetric case with no externality (x = 0) the competitivestrategy
prole in which each bidder demands three units until the price reaches the bidders value
at which point the bidder reduces demand to zero units. It is easy to derive bidders on-
the-equilibrium-path beliefs: at price p, a bidders beliefs about a rivals value is that it is
uniformly distributed on [p; 1]. To show that the competitive strategy prole can be part of
ascending auctions this happened when the sum of the initially demanded quantities was less than 6. In the
discriminatory auctions this would occur when in total fewer than 6 bids were submitted.
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a PBE, we have to consider deviations from equilibrium play and specify corresponding o¤-
the-equilibrium-path beliefs to show that such deviations are not protable. Suppose that at
price level p, bidder 3 reduces demand from three units to a single unit (we deal with the case
in which demand is reduced to two units below) and let fi(v3jp) denote the beliefs of bidders
i = 1; 2 about bidder 3s value once this deviation occurs. Depending on bidder is belief, it
may be optimal for bidder i to continue bidding or to reduce demand to two units in which
case the auction stops. In the latter case bidder 3s deviation can be protable,11 which would
destroy the competitive PBE. In other words, for the competitive strategy prole to be part of
a PBE, bidders 1 and 2 have to believe it is optimal for them to continue bidding after bidder
3 deviates by reducing demand to a single unit at price p. This occurs when bidders 1 and 2
think that the deviation indicates that bidder 3 is relatively weak:
fi(v3jp) = e
 (v3 p)
1  e (1 p) ; (1)
for p  v3  1 and  > 0, i.e. bidders 1 and 2 believe that bidder 3s value is (exponentially)
skewed towards lower values on [p; 1].
We next show that given these o¤-the-equilibrium-path beliefs, bidders 1 and 2 will demand
three units until the price is (arbitrarily close to) their values, as they would have if no deviation
had occurred. Suppose not and bidder i reduces demand to two units at some price level p0
where p  p0 < vi. The marginal gain of reducing demand a little later, say at price p0 + , is
that one of the other two bidders reduces demand by one unit between p0 and p0 +  and an
additional unit is won. The marginal cost is that bidder i has to pay  more for the two units.
Hence, the net gain is
 
n
(vi   p0)
 
fi(p
0jp0) + 1
1  p0
  2o;
where the rst (second) term in parentheses occurs when bidder 3 (bidder j 6= i; 3) reduces
demand by one unit between p0 and p0 + . Since fi(p0jp0) > , the marginal gain of reducing
demand a little later is strictly positive for all p0 < vi 2=. Hence, for large , it is optimal for
bidder i to keep demanding three units until the price level is (arbitrarily close) to her value.
To summarize, given the o¤-the-equilibrium-path beliefs in (1), bidders 1 and 2 continue
demanding three units until the price reaches their values. In other words, their behavior is
una¤ected by bidder 3s deviation, which is therefore not protable: if, after deviating, bidder
3 wins one unit at some price less than her value then she could have won three units at that
price had she not deviated. For the same reason, the o¤-the-equilibrium-path beliefs in (1)
ensure that it is not protable for bidder 3 to reduce demand to two units (instead of one unit)
11Note that in the competitive PBE, the probability that a bidder with value v3 wins three units is 1 (1 v3)2,
i.e. the chance that the bidders value is not the lowest, and a simple envelope argument establishes that her
equilibrium payo¤s are 3v23   v33 . The payo¤ from deviating is v3 if bidder 3 reduces demand to 1 unit at p = 0
and another bidder reduces demand to two units in response. For small v3, the deviation is therefore protable.
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as such a deviation makes it even less attractive for bidder i = 1; 2 to reduce demand early (i.e.
before the price reaches their values). We thus have:
Lemma 1. With no externality (x = 0), the competitive strategy prole in which each bidder
demands three licenses until the price level reaches her value (plus a consistent belief system)
is a perfect-Bayesian equilibrium of the ascending auction.
As is typical for dynamic games, the competitive PBE is not the unique equilibrium of the
ascending auction. We next consider the possibility of a demand reduction equilibrium, i.e. a
symmetric strategy prole where all three bidders behave competitively up to some price level
p and then all bidders reduce their demand to two units. To verify that this is a PBE, suppose
that if bidder 3 deviates and continues demanding three units when the price reaches p then
the beliefs of bidders i = 1; 2 are again given by (1) so that they bid competitively after bidder
3s deviation. We next verify that bidder 3s deviation is not protable. Bidder 3s payo¤ of
deviating is maxb(3(bjv3; p)), where 3(bjv3; p) denotes bidder 3s payo¤ when she is willing to
keep bidding on three licenses until the price level reaches b  p after which she stops, i.e.
reduces her demand to two licenses, and the auction ends.12
3(bjv3; p) = 3
Z b
p
Z b
p
(v3  min(v1; v2))dv1dv2
+ 3
Z b
p
Z 1
b
(v3   v1)dv1dv2 + 3
Z 1
b
Z b
p
(v3   v2)dv1dv2
+ 2
Z 1
b
Z 1
b
(v3   b)dv1dv2: (2)
Here the top line corresponds to the case where bidder 3 has the highest-value, in the middle
line bidder 3 has the middle value, and in the bottom line bidder 3 has the lowest value. It is
readily veried that
03(bjv3; p) =  2(1  b)(1  v3)  0; (3)
so bidder 3s payo¤ is maximized by choosing b = p, i.e. reducing demand to two licenses at
price p. We thus have:
Lemma 2. With no externality (x = 0), the strategy prole in which each bidder bids com-
petitively until the price level reaches 0  p  1 and then reduces demand to two units (plus a
consistent belief system) is a perfect-Bayesian equilibrium of the ascending auction.
Note that for p = 1, the PBE of Lemma 2 reproduces that of Lemma 1.
12Recall that if the other bidders each demand two licenses and bidder 1 initially demands three licenses,
she cannot lower her demand below two licenses since total demand cannot fall below the total supply of six
licenses.
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Now suppose the entrant imposes a negative externality (x > 0) on the incumbents when
she wins a license. Also in this case there exists a continuum of PBEs parameterized by a
price level 0  p  1 at which all bidders reduce demand to two units. The intuition is that
the demand reduction part of the PBEs described in Lemma 2, i.e. the part that applies once
the price reaches p, can be sustained when x > 0 since no incumbent bidder can avoid the
negative externality once the other two bidders demand only two units. (Once the price level
reaches p, the negative externality becomes a sunk cost that does not a¤ect an incumbents
optimization problem.) However, when x > 0, it is not necessarily optimal for an incumbent
bidder to demand three units until the price reaches her value and then reduce demand to zero
units. Since incumbents prot from excluding the entrant from the market, it can be optimal
for them to continue demanding three units at even higher prices.
We next derive the set of cheap preemptive PBEs, where an incumbent bidder with value v
demands three units up to a price level BI(v) that may exceed her value and all bidders reduce
their demand to two units if the price level reaches p. The di¤erential equation that determines
BI(v) can be derived from a simple marginal argument. Suppose an incumbent who has value
v acts as if her value were v + . Such a deviation alters the outcome of the auction only if
the bidder turns from a loser into one of the winners. This requires that either (i) the other
incumbent has a value between v and v +  and the entrant has a value higher than BI(v), or
(ii) the entrant has a value between BI(v) and BI(v + ) and the other incumbent has a value
higher than v. The former case happens with probability (1 BI(v)) and the bidders net gain
of deviating from v to v +  in this case would be 3v   3BI(v). The latter case happens with
probability B0I(v)(1  v) and the net gain would be 3v  3BI(v) + x. In equilibrium, the total
net gain should be zero:
(1 BI(v))(3v   3BI(v)) +B0I(v)(1  v)(3v   3BI(v) + x) = 0: (4)
The incumbents optimal bid function is uniquely determined by this rst-order condition and
the boundary condition BI(p) = p.13
To solve the rst-order condition in (4) it will prove useful to consider a related di¤erential
equation
zG0(z) = 2(1 +G(z)  z2G(z)2); (5)
with general solution
Gp;x(z) =
1
z
I1(2z) + p;xK1(2z)
I2(2z)  p;xK2(2z) (6)
for z  0. Here In (Kn) is the nth modied Bessel function of the rst (second) kind and p;x
is a constant chosen such that the boundary condition BI(p) = p is satised. In the proof of
13Suppose instead that BI(v) = p where v < p. As the price level approaches p, an incumbent of type v would
be better o¤ reducing demand to two units slightly before p and incur the negative externality, rather than
waiting to reduce demand to two units at p since then she also incurs the negative externality plus 2(v p) < 0.
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Proposition 1 below we show that this boundary condition is met if p;x = 

1 p
x=3

where we
dene
(z) =
I2(2z)  (1  1=z)I1(2z)
K2(2z) + (1  1=z)K1(2z) (7)
Lemma 3. Gp;x() and () satisfy the following properties:
(i) (z) is strictly increasing in z with (0) = 0.
(ii) Gp;x(z) has an asymptote at z = z
 where z solves I2(2z)=K2(2z) = p;x.
(iii) The inverse G( 1)p;x (z) is well dened for z 2 D where
D =
(
[ x=3
1 x=3 ;
x=3
1 x=3 p ] if p < 1  x=3
[ x=3
1 x=3 ;1) [ ( 1; x=31 x=3 p ] if p > 1  x=3
and G( 1)p;x (z) for z 2 D is minimized at z = x=31 x=3 p with G( 1)p;x ( x=31 x=3 p) = 1 px=3 .
(iv) For z 2 Int(D) we have
1
z
1
z
+ 1

< G( 1)p;x (z)
2 <
1
z
+ 1
2
(8)
Proof. Properties (i) and (ii) can be veried by plotting the right side of (7) and the ratio
of modied Bessel functions I2(2z)=K2(2z). To establish (iii) note that if Gp;x(z)  0 then (6)
implies that Gp;x(z)  G0(z)  I1(2z)=(zI2(2z)) and using standard properties of the modied
Bessel functions we have
1
G0(z)
 1
G0(z)
+ 1

=
I0(2z)I2(2z)
I1(2z)I1(2z)

z2 < z2
Since Gp;x(z)  G0(z) we conclude that
1
Gp;x(z)
 1
Gp;x(z)
+ 1

< z2 (9)
when Gp;x(z)  0. Moreover, inequality (9) is (trivially) satised when Gp;x(z)   1 since
then the left side is non-positive. Combined with (5) inequality (9) implies that Gp;x(z) is
strictly decreasing, and, hence, invertible when Gp;x(z)   1 or Gp(z)  0. This proves
that G( 1)p;x (z) is well dened for z 2 D since D  [0;1) [ ( 1; 1] for all 0  p  1 and
x > 0. If p < 1   x=3 then G( 1)p;x (z) is strictly decreasing on [ x=31 x=3 ; x=31 x=3 p ] and is thus
minimized at z = x=3
1 x=3 p . If p > 1   x=3 then G( 1)p;x (z) declines on [ x=31 x=3 ;1) and it declines
on ( 1; x=3
1 x=3 p ] with G
( 1)
p;x (1) = z, so the minimum is again attained at z = x=31 x=3 p . A
direct computation veries that Gp;x(
1 p
x=3
) = x=3
1 x=3 p , or, equivalently G
( 1)
p;x (
x=3
1 x=3 p) =
1 p
x=3
.
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Finally, the left inequality of (iv) follows from (9) and the fact that G( 1)p;x (z) is well dened
for z 2 D. To show the right inequality of (iv), note that G( 1)p;x (z) < 1=z + 1 is equivalent to
z < 1=Gp;x(z) + 1, which using (6) can be written as
1  1
z
<
I2(2z)  p;xK2(2z)
I1(2z) + p;xK1(2z)
Using p;x = 
 
1 p
x=3

and the denition of () in (7) this can be rewritten as (z) >  1 p
x=3

.
Since () is increasing, the right inequality in (iv) follows if z >  1 p
x=3

for all z such that
Gp;x(z) 2 Int(D). Since 1 px=3 = G( 1)p;x ( x=31 x=3 p) this is true if G( 1)p;x (z) > G( 1)p;x ( x=31 x=3 p) for all
z 2 Int(D), which holds since G( 1)p;x (z) is minimized at z = x=31 x=3 p .
We are now in the position to characterize the cheap preemptive PBEs for the ascending auction:
Proposition 1. For 0  p  1 and x > 0, the following strategy prole (plus a consistent belief
system) is a cheap preemptive perfect-Bayesian equilibrium of the ascending auction:
(i) an entrant with value v demands three units until the price reaches the lower of v, at
which point she demands zero units, and p, at which point she demands two units,
(ii) an incumbent with value v demands three units until the price reaches the lower of BI(v),
at which point she demands zero units, and p, at which point she demands two units, where
BI(v) = 1  (x=3)
2
1  v G
( 1)
p;x
 x=3
1  x=3  v
2
(10)
is strictly increasing for 0  v < p with BI(p) = p.
(iii) The incumbents bid function (10) satises v < BI(v) < v + x=3 for 0  v < p.
(iv) When x ! 0, the incumbents bid function (10) limits to BI(v) = v and the cheap
preemptive PBE reproduces that of Lemma 2.
The limit cases of p = 0 and p = 1 will be referred to as the demand reduction PBEand the
preemptive PBErespectively.
Proof. Note that for 0  v  p and 0  p  1, the ratio (x=3)=(1  x=3  v) lies in the set
( 1; 1] [ [0;1) on which G( 1)p;x is well dened (see proof of Lemma 3). We rst verify the
necessary (rst-order and boundary) conditions. Di¤erentiating (10) with respect to v yields
B0I(v) =  
(x=3)2
(1  v)2G
( 1)
p;x
 x=3
1  x=3  v
2
  (x=3)
2
(1  v)
x=3
(1  x=3  v)2
2G
( 1)
p;x
  (x=3)
1 x=3 v

G0p;x
 
G
( 1)
p;x (
x=3
1 x=3 v )

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Using (10) we can rewrite this as
B0I(v) =  
1 BI(v)
1  v

1 +
(1  v)(x=3)
(1  x=3  v)2
2
G
( 1)
p;x
 
x=3
1 x=3 v

G0p;x
 
G
( 1)
p;x (
x=3
1 x=3 v )

which can be rewritten using (5)
B0I(v) =  
1 BI(v)
1  v

1 +
(1  v)(x=3)
(1  x=3  v)2
1
1 + (x=3)
(1 x=3 v)   (x=3)
2
(1 x=3 v)2G
( 1)
p;x
  x=3
1 x=3 v
2
which, using (10), further simplies to
B0I(v) =  
1 BI(v)
1  v

1 +
(1  v)(x=3)
(1  x=3  v)2
1
1 + (x=3)
(1 x=3 v)   (1 v)(1 BI(v))(1 x=3 v)2

and, after rearranging terms
B0I(v) =
(1 BI(v))(BI(v)  v)
(1  v)(v  BI(v) + x=3)
which is the rst-order condition in (4). To verify the boundary condition, note that BI(p) = p
can be rewritten as
G( 1)p;x
 x=3
1  x=3  p

=
1  p
x=3
or, equivalently,
x=3
1  x=3  p = Gp;x
1  p
x=3

which yields a linear equation in p;x, see (6), that can readily be solved to yield p;x = 
 
1 p
x=3

,
with () dened in (7).
To show that BI(v) < v + x=3, use the left inequality of (8) in property (iv) of Lemma 3
BI(v) < 1  (x=3)
2
1  v
1
x=3
1 x=3 v
 1
x=3
1 x=3 v
+ 1

= v + x=3
Similarly, the right inequality in (8) implies
BI(v) > 1  (x=3)
2
1  v
 1
x=3
1 x=3 v
+ 1
2
= v
Note that v < BI(v) < v + x=3 for 0  v < p implies that B0I(v) > 0 for all 0  v < p, see the
rst-order condition (4).
Finally, property (iv) follows from the fact that G( 1)p;x (z)  1=z for z small. Hence, as x
tends to zero, BI(v) limits to
lim
x!0
BI(v) = lim
x!0
1  (x=3)
2
1  v
1  x=3  v
x=3
)2 = 1  (1  v) = v
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We next have to show that no bidder wants to deviate from the proposed PBE. For the
demand reduction part, i.e. the part corresponding to when the price reaches p, this simply
follows from the logic preceding Lemma 2 because at price level p the negative externality
cannot be avoided (and becomes a sunk cost). For price levels less than p we have to dene
appropriate o¤-the-equilibrium-path beliefs if one of the bidders deviates from the proposed
PBE and show that the resulting optimal choices (given these beliefs) render the deviation
unprotable.
Suppose the entrant deviates by reducing demand to one unit at price p0 < p and incumbents
beliefs about the entrants value are given by (1) for very high , i.e. the incumbents believe
the price is very close to the entrants value and the entrant is about to reduce demand to zero
units. We show that given these beliefs the entrants deviation will cause the incumbents to bid
more aggressively: an incumbent with value v will now demand three units up to a price level
of v + x. Suppose not and an incumbent bidder reduces demand to two units at some price
level p00 where p0  p00 < v + x. The marginal gain of reducing demand a little later, say at
price p00 + , is that the entrant drops out in between p00 and p00 +  in which case an additional
unit is won and the externality is avoided.14 The marginal cost is that the incumbent has to
pay  more for the two units. Hence, the net gain is
 
n
(v + x  p00)fi(p00jp00)  2
o
;
which is strictly positive for all p00 < v + x   2=. So an incumbent will not reduce demand
before v + x > BI(v) after the entrants deviation, and, hence, the entrants deviation is not
protable. (The case where the entrant reduces demand to two units at p0 < p can be treated
similarly.)
Finally, suppose an incumbent with value v deviates by reducing demand to one or two units
at price p0 < BI(v). In this case, the other incumbent cannot avoid the negative externality.
If othersbeliefs about the deviating incumbents value are again given by (1) they will not
reduce demand until their values are reached. Given this, the deviating incumbent will not
reduce demand further until her value, v, is reached. Moreover, if the deviating incumbents
out-of-equilibrium beliefs about othersvalues are that they are no less than her own, then the
gain from her deviation is the same as when she would have reduced demand to zero units,
which cannot be protable because the optimal point at which to reduce demand to zero units
is given by (10).
The incumbentsbid functions for the three levels of x employed in the experiment are given
in Figure 1 for p = 0:5, p = 0:75, and p = 0:99. Note that incumbents bids exceed their true
values.
14Note that we only consider the event that the entrant reduces her demand to zero units, not the other
incumbent reducing her demand to two units, since this event is much more likely for  very high.
15
[ Figure 1 about here ]
Proposition 1 characterizes a continuum of PBE, ranging from the demand reduction PBE
(p = 0) to the preemptive PBE(p = 1). As usual, by considering di¤erent out-of-equilibrium
beliefs, other equilibria become possible. In particular, asymmetric equilibria in which the two
incumbents have di¤erent strategies may exist. We dont provide a comprehensive equilibrium
characterization. Rather, Proposition 1 is meant to provide a theoretical motivation for our
experiments where both demand reduction and preemptive bidding (and, as shown, anything
in between) can occur in equilibrium. It is not a priori clear which outcome is more focal, so
our experiments provide an empirical test of the drawing power of these two opposing bidding
forces.
3.2 Discriminatory auction
The demand reduction equilibrium cannot be sustained in the discriminatory auction since
bidders cannot alter the prices they pay for the licenses they win by bidding low on other
licenses. In fact, the discriminatory auction has an equilibrium in which a bidder places the
same bid for each of the three licenses she is competing for.15 We solely focus on this type of
equilibrium in our theoretical analysis. Consider therefore the preemptive equilibrium where
all three bidders bid on all three items, and incumbents take into account their true values
and the externality x > 0. It will prove useful to introduce the inverses E(b) and I(b) of
the bidding functions BE(v) and BI(v) respectively. The di¤erential equations the inverse bid
functions have to satisfy can be derived from a marginal analysis similar to the one in the
previous subsection. For the entrant we have
 3 1  (1  I(b))2+ 3(E(b)  b) 1  (1  I(b))20 = 0: (11)
To understand this equation recall that, in equilibrium, the gain for an entrant of type E(b)
of bidding b +  instead of b should balance the cost. The cost of such a deviation is 3 when
the entrant is not the lowest bidder, which happens with probability (1   (1   I(b))2). The
potential gain 3(E(b)   b) occurs when the deviation changes her from a loser to a winner,
which happens when the lowest of the two incumbent values was somewhere between I(b) and
15Suppose two bidders each submit only a single bid that applies to all three licenses. We have to show that
the third bidders best response is to also submit a single bid. Let v denote the bidders value and b1  b2  b3
her bids. The optimal b3 is determined by trading o¤ the prot conditional on winning, v   b3, against the
probability of winning as determined by the distribution of the sixth-highest of the othersbids. Likewise, the
optimal b2 (b1) is determined by trading o¤ v  b2 (v  b1) against the winning probability as determined by the
distribution of the fth-highest (fourth-highest) of othersbids, since one (two) of the own bids are higher. But
if the other two bidders submit only a single bid then the distributions of the sixth, fth, and fourth highest
of othersbids are identical. Hence, b1 = b2 = b3. Lebrun and Tremblay (2003) prove that for the case of
two bidders (and no externalities), the equilibrium in which bidders submit only a single bid is the unique
equilibrium of the discriminatory auction.
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I(b + ): the probability of this event is (1   (1   I(b))2)0. Similarly, for the incumbent
bidders we have
 3 1  (1  I(b))(1  E(b))+3(I(b)  b) 1  (1  I(b))(1  E(b))0
+x0E(b)(1  I(b)) = 0: (12)
The two terms in the top line have the same interpretation as in equation (11). The extra
term in the bottom line occurs when a losing incumbent, by raising her bid slightly, beats the
entrants bid, which has the extra benet that the negative externality is avoided. This happens
when the entrants value was between E(b) and E(b + ) and the other incumbents value
was above I(b): the probability of this event is 0E(b)(1  I(b)).
For the case with no externality, x = 0, the rst-order di¤erential equations (11) and (12)
can be solved to yield I(b) = E(b) = (b) where
(b) =
1
4

3 + 3b 
p
9  30b+ 9b2

; (13)
dened for 0  b  1
3
with (0) = 0 and (1
3
) = 1. Since the di¤erential equations (11) and
(12) are necessary conditions and their solutions are unique, the inverse bid functions constitute
the unique equilibrium (in which each bidder submits three identical bids). It is straightforward
to invert (13) to yield the symmetric bidding function as shown by the thick solid line in Figure
5.16
Proposition 2. With no externality, the unique symmetric equilibrium of the discriminatory
auction in which each bidder submits three identical bids is given by
BI(v) = BE(v) =
v
3
3  2v
2  v

: (14)
In the presence of an externality, x > 0, no analytic solutions to the above di¤erential equations
(11) and (12) exist. They can, however, be solved using numerical techniques. For the two
values of x used in the experiment, x = 1
2
and x = 1, the bid functions for the entrant and the
incumbents are shown as grey curves in Figures 6 and 7. Notice that incumbentsbids exceed
those of an entrant with the same value. Also, low-value incumbents bid above their true values
even though in a discriminatory auction they will have to pay their own bid when they win.
We are interested to what extent the ascending format of the previous subsection is more (or
less) prone to preemptive bidding than the discriminatory auction studied here. One natural
measure is the probability that the entrant wins a license in either format. The theoretical
16The equilibrium bid functions of Proposition 2 can also be derived more directly. Note that the payo¤ of a
bidder who has value v but bids as if her value is w is given by e(wjv) = (v B(w))(1  (1 w)2). Optimizing
with respect to w and equating the result to zero at w = v yields a rst-order di¤erential equation that is solved
by (14).
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prediction depends on which equilibrium is selected in the ascending auction. If the demand
reduction equilibrium of the ascending auction is selected, the entrant always enters independent
of the level of externality. As a result, the probability of entry is larger in the ascending auction
than in the discriminatory auction in this case.
In a preemptive equilibrium where bidders place the same bids on all three licenses, entry
occurs when the entrantsbid is not the lowest:
Pentry =
Z 1
E(BI(0))
(1  (1  I(BE(vE)))2)dvE; (15)
where BI() and BE() are the optimal bidding functions in the respective auction formats,
and I() and E() are their inverses. Using the numerical solutions in Figures 1 and 5-7 it
is straightforward to determine the entrants entry probability for the di¤erent scenarios. In
the preemptive equilibrium of the ascending auction they are 66.7%, 57.3%, and 45.4% when
x = 0, x = 50, and x = 100 respectively. In the discriminatory auction they are 66.7%, 61.0%,
and 55.3% when x = 0, x = 50, and x = 100 respectively. When bidding is coordinated on
the preemptive equilibrium, the ascending auction is more prone to preemptive behavior by the
incumbents.
Part of the intuition behind this result is that in the discriminatory auction incumbents
face a strategic risk if they try to keep out newcomers, which they do not have in the ascending
auction. In the discriminatory auction it may namely happen that an incumbent attaches
high values to the licenses and bids high, while the fellow incumbent attaches low values to
the licenses and bids low. As a consequence, the newcomer enters the market and a negative
external e¤ect materializes while at the same time the competitive incumbent pays a lot for the
licenses that it obtains. Clearly, the incumbentsequilibrium bids take this risk into account
(and incumbents bid less than in the absence of this risk). In the ascending auction, an
incumbent bidder only bids above the licensesvalues if the fellow incumbent is still active in
the auction. So this strategic risk does not exist in the ascending auction.
Finally, we briey discuss what would happen if the assumption that bids cannot exceed
three units is dropped (without formal analysis). It is interesting to consider the possibility
that a bidder can buy all 6 units, although we do not know of any practical cases where
an individual bidder was allowed to capture the whole market. When the negative externality
becomes su¢ ciently high, the demand reduction equilibrium will cease to exist with unrestricted
bidders, because an incumbent will want to deviate from sharing the market equally and try
to work out the entrant on its own.17 Likewise, our conjecture is that unrestricted incumbents
17The demand reduction equilibrium may also vanish in some cases where the negative externality depends on
the number of units bought by the entrant. If the di¤erence in negative externality when the entrant acquires
2 licenses instead of 1 license is su¢ ciently large, an incumbent may want to deviate from equally sharing the
licenses and try to obtain 3 units so that possibly only 1 unit remains for the entrant (when the other incumbent
bids su¢ ciently high on the remaining 2 units).
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will compete ercer both in the preemptive equilibrium of the ascending auction and in the
equilibrium of the discriminatory auction, because there is a chance that they can work out the
entrant by themselves. As a result, the entrant will be forced to bid higher as well. Therefore, a
seller who is only interested in maximizing revenue may be well advised to drop the restriction
on the number of licenses that bidders can acquire. Since it allows for the possibility that
a monopolist buys all the available licenses, it may lead to a serious cost to e¢ ciency in the
aftermarket, though.
4 Results
We present our ndings in two parts. We start with an overview of the aggregate results and
compare the performance of the two auctions in terms of revenue, e¢ ciency and opportunities
for entry. Under the ascending auction, a continuum of equilibria exist (cf. Subsection 3.1). In
Subsection 4.1, we take the two extreme equilibria as natural benchmarks and refer to these as
the Nash demand reduction equilibrium (p = 0) and the Nash preemptive equilibrium (p = 1),
respectively. In Subsection 4.2, we subsequently discuss the main patterns in the individual
bidding data and we address the matter of equilibrium selection in ascending auctions. There,
we also relate our ndings to the Nash cheap preemptiveequilibria with 0 < p < 1 that exist
in the ascending auction.
Most of our results are roughly the same for the 15 periods of part 1 where we used low
stakes and the single period of part 2 where we used high stakes. To present our ndings in a
compact manner, we have chosen to pool the results of parts 1 and 2 and to report separate
results only in those cases where they di¤er signicantly.
When comparing di¤erent auctions, we make use of two testing procedures. The rst is
a prudent non-parametric procedure where we use independent averages per group as data
points. Thus, the reported Mann-Whitney tests all make use of 8 data points per treatment.
The second is a parametric testing procedure where we estimate the treatment e¤ect on the
basis of all data with the help of a regression with a random e¤ect term for the groups. Here,
we only include a dummy for the treatment variable and determine whether it is signicant.
The rst procedure has the advantage that no assumptions are made about the distributions
of the relevant variables. By taking the averages per group we obtain independent data as
required for the test, but we lose statistical information about the variance within a group.
The second procedure does not su¤er from this disadvantage, at a cost of making assumptions
about the distribution.
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4.1 Revenue, e¢ ciency and entry
Table 2 shows that, for all levels of the externality x, the discriminatory auction raises more
revenue than the ascending auction. The table lists the observed average revenues together with
the predicted revenues.18 For the ascending auctions we show the predicted revenues based on
the preemptive equilibrium (p = 1) and those based on the demand reduction equilibrium
(p = 0).19 As explained in the previous section, the latter equilibrium does not exist in the
discriminatory auction. With negative external e¤ects the ascending auctions raise about 50%
of the revenue collected in the discriminatory auctions. Without external e¤ects the ascending
auction performs even worse. The di¤erences between the two auctions are highly signicant.
In the discriminatory auctions, the actual revenues trace the predicted revenues very closely
for disc0 and disc50 and reasonably well for disc100. In the ascending auctions, the average
revenues fall short of the revenues predicted on the basis of the preemptive equilibrium. In
these auctions, the demand reduction equilibrium with zero revenue turns out to be a strong
force pulling the revenues downward.20
Figures 2 through 4 show histograms of the revenues for the cases x = 0, x = 50 and x = 100,
respectively. Without external e¤ects the frequency distribution of the ascending auction has a
pronounced mode at zero revenue. Even when negative external e¤ects are introduced the mode
of the distribution stays at zero, although somewhat less pronounced. So demand reduction
seems to be the strongest force in the ascending auctions, even when one of the bidders produces
a substantial negative externality for the others.
[ Figures 2 through 4 about here ]
Sellers will typically be interested in the robustness of an auction and dislike formats that
produce unpredictable outcomes. Note that the discriminatory auctions also beat the ascending
18Parts 1 and 2 of the experiment resulted in statistically similar revenues for 5 out of 6 treatments; when
we consider the realized revenues as a fraction of the available Nash revenues at the preemptive equilibrium,
the only signicant di¤erence is obtained for the treatment disc100. Here the relative revenue provides the
appropriate measure for comparison between parts 1 and 2, because we kept values constant across treatments
but not across parts. As it appears the randomly drawn values of part 2 are accidentally more favorable for
raising revenue. In treatment disc100, average observed revenue equals 190:5 in part 1 and 284:8 in part 2,
while the predicted Nash preemptive revenues equal 217:6 and 242:4, respectively. The ratios of these observed
and predicted revenues di¤er signicantly (Mann-Whitney rank test (m = n = 8; p = 0:02). The test results of
the other 5 treatments are far from signicant, however (all p > 0:28).
19In all cases the predictions listed in Table 2 are based on the actual private value draws used in the
experiments. These predictions may slightly di¤er from the ones based on the U [0; 100] distribution (cf. Section
3). E.g., when x = 0 the preemptive equilibria of the two auction formats are revenue equivalent in the general
model and are predicted to yield the seller 150. Yet for the particular private values that we use the preemptive
equilibrium in the ascending auction yields a slightly higher revenue (162.8 on average) than the equilibrium in
the discriminatory auction (148.9).
20The levels of demand reduction in parts 1 and 2 are of the same magnitude. For instance, 6 of the 8 groups
in asc0 successfully reduced demand in part 2. This suggests that bidders reduce their demand for the right
non-cooperative reasons, and that it is not due to a repeated game e¤ect or low stakes.
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Table 2: Revenues
Discr. dummy
Ascending Discriminatory MW-test (Random E¤ects)
x = 0 Actual 39:6 71 :4 151:9 54 :3 p = 0:00 112:3 14 :4 p = 0:00
Nash preempt 162:8 117 :4 148:9 36 :1
Nash dem red 0:0 0 :0
x = 50 Actual 93:0 116 :0 182:3 63 :5 p = 0:00 89:3 19 :2 p = 0:00
Nash preempt 197:1 119 :4 183:3 35 :7
Nash dem red 0:0 0 :0
x = 100 Actual 102:0 140 :9 196:4 89 :3 p = 0:00 94:3 24 :1 p = 0:00
Nash preempt 234:0 128 :3 219:2 34 :8
Nash dem red 0:0 0 :0
Mann- x=0 vs x=50 p = 0:04 p = 0:02
Whitney x=50 vs x=100 p = 0:83 p = 0:21
x=0 vs x=100 p = 0:02 p = 0:02
Notes: Standard deviations in italics. The Mann-Whitney ranksum tests reported in the column
MW-testcompare the realized revenues for the ascending and discriminatory auctions using the 8
average observations per independent group as data. The nal three rows report the similar Mann-
Whitney test results for comparisons across di¤erent values of the externality x, for each auction
format separately. The nal column reports the signicance of the discriminatory auction dummy
variable in a regression with a random e¤ect term for the groups.
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auctions in this respect. Table 2 shows that, although the discriminatory auctions result in a
higher variance of revenues than theory predicts, they do better than the ascending auctions.
This result is conrmed graphically in Figures 2 through 4.
In both types of auctions the presence of a bidder who imposes negative externalities on
others is good news for the seller who is interested in maximizing revenue. In the ascending
auctions, the seller collects signicantly more revenue when there is a moderate external e¤ect
of x = 50 than when there is no external e¤ect. An increase of the negative external e¤ect to
x = 100 further enhances the revenue for the seller but not signicantly so. The introduction of a
bidder with negative e¤ects for the others has quantitatively smaller e¤ects in the discriminatory
auctions. The test results are similar though: the di¤erence in revenue between disc50 and disc0
is signicant, while the di¤erence between disc100 and disc50 is not. We summarize the above
ndings on revenue in the following result:
Result 1. (i) For every level of the external e¤ect, x, the discriminatory auction raises signif-
icantly more revenue than the ascending auction. (ii) In both auction formats the presence of
negative externalities (of either x = 50 or x = 100) increases the sellers revenue compared to
the situation where externalities are absent (x = 0).
Ascending auctions are often promoted on e¢ ciency grounds, i.e. they put the licenses in the
hands of the rms that value them the most.Although the argument is basically sound, there
are two countervailing forces in the present situation. Consider the case where government
sells licenses to use gas stations along highways. Here, colluding incumbents may coordinate to
keep a price-ghting entrant out. Although the ascending auction may put the licenses in the
hands of the incumbents who value them the most, this may very well harm consumer surplus
and social e¢ ciency (for this argument, see also Ewerhart and Moldovanu 2001). The other
possibility why an ascending auction may harm e¢ ciency occurs when rms decide to split the
market as predicted by the demand reduction equilibrium. This equilibrium puts some licenses
in the hands of rms with inferior private value components. So in the end it is an empirical
question which of the auction formats should be chosen to pursue e¢ ciency.
We rst report the results for an e¢ ciency measure that is valid for industries where the
negative externality imposed on incumbents does not represent a social harm. Consider the
example where a price-ghting entrant tries to penetrate a market of colluding incumbents. Here
the price-ghter will produce a negative externality for the incumbents, but not for society.21
For this type of example the traditional e¢ ciency measure seems most appropriate. This
measure is calculated as the ratio of the sum of the realized private (or use) values and the
21To the contrary, society as a whole may actually become strictly better o¤ when competition is intensied.
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Table 3: E¢ ciency in % based on use values only
Discr. dummy
Ascending Discriminatory MW-test (Random e¤ects)
x = 0 Actual 85:6 10 :4 95:5 6 :7 p = 0:00 9:9 1 :9 p = 0:00
Nash preempt 100:0 0 :0 100:0 0 :0
Nash dem red 81:0 8 :9
x = 50 Actual 88:6 11 :6 95:9 6 :2 p = 0:00 7:3 1 :9 p = 0:00
Nash preempt 99:7 1 :4 99:8 1 :2
Nash dem red 81:0 8 :9
x = 100 Actual 89:6 10 :2 93:1 10 :2 p = 0:09 3:5 1 :9 p = 0:06
Nash preempt 97:5 5 :8 99:2 3 :5
Nash dem red 81:0 8 :9
Mann- x=0 vs x=50 p = 0:21 p = 0:83
Whitney x=50 vs x=100 p = 0:92 p = 0:10
x=0 vs x=100 p = 0:09 p = 0:12
Notes: Standard deviations in italics. The Mann-Whitney ranksum tests reported in the column
MW-testcompare the realized revenues for the ascending and discriminatory auctions using the 8
average observations per independent group as data. The nal three rows report the similar Mann-
Whitney test results for comparisons across di¤erent values of the externality x, for each auction
format separately. The nal column reports the signicance of the discriminatory auction dummy
variable in a regression with a random e¤ect term for the groups.
maximally available sum of private values. To be precise, it is calculated as:
E¤ use value =
nP
j=1
vwin, j
3vmax + 3vmid
 100%
where n goods are sold, vwin, j refers to the value of the winner of good j, vmax to the maximum
private value in the group and vmid to the middle private value of the group. Table 3 presents
the results for this e¢ ciency measure. Notice that the discriminatory auctions produce higher
e¢ ciency levels than the ascending auctions. The di¤erences in e¢ ciency levels are noteworthy
and signicant for the treatments without externalities (x = 0) and the ones with mild exter-
nalities (x = 50). For the auctions with strong externalities (x = 100) the e¤ect is small and
insignicant at the conventional level.
Without externalities the e¢ ciency level in the ascending auctions is closer to the level
predicted by the demand reduction equilibrium than the level predicted by the preemptive
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equilibrium. When externalities are introduced, actual e¢ ciency moves slowly into the direc-
tion of the level predicted in the preemptive equilibrium. The realized e¢ ciency level is about
halfway between the two predicted levels when the negative externality is strong (x = 100).
However, the increases in e¢ ciency levels as the level of the external e¤ect rises are not sig-
nicant. A similar result applies for the discriminatory auctions; observed e¢ ciency levels are
independent of the level of the external e¤ect.
There may also be situations where the negative externality represents a social harm, e.g.
when a polluting rm acquires a license. In such cases it makes sense to incorporate the
externality in the e¢ ciency measure. A straightforward way to do this is to calculate the realized
e¢ ciency level as the ratio of the realized surplus and the theoretically available surplus. Here
the realized surplus equals the sum of the realized private values minus the sum of the realized
negative externalities. The theoretically available surplus is determined by the allocation that
maximizes the sum of the private values diminished by the corresponding negative external
e¤ects. This leads to:
E¤ external e¤ect =
 2x  IfE entersg +
nP
j=1
vwin, j
maxf3vA + 3vB ; 3vmax{A,B} + 3vE   2xg  100%
where vA, vB, vE refer to the values of incumbents A and B and entrant E respectively,
vmax{A,B} to the maximum value of A and B and IfE entersg an indicator function equal to one
i¤ the entrants enters (and 0 otherwise). Table 4 shows the results for this e¢ ciency measure.
Again the discriminatory auction signicantly outperforms the ascending auctions for the case
of mild externalities, but not for the case of strong externalities.
In the ascending auctions, the e¢ ciency levels are roughly halfway the level predicted by
the demand reduction equilibrium and the preemptive equilibrium. Because these predicted
levels decrease with the level of the external e¤ect, so do the actual e¢ ciency levels. In the
discriminatory auctions the e¢ ciency levels decrease signicantly with the level of the external
e¤ect as well. Result 2 summarizes our ndings concerning e¢ ciency.
Result 2. (i) The discriminatory auction yields higher e¢ ciency levels than the ascending
auction for every level of the external e¤ect, x. (ii) In both auction formats, the presence of
negative externalities decreases e¢ ciency (only) when the externality represents a social harm.
Policy makers often want to know how particular auction formats a¤ect the chances for possible
entrants. It has been argued that auctions with a discriminatory element o¤er better chances
to entrants than ascending auctions since the latter o¤er incumbents the possibility to trail
entrants and outbid them with the smallest possible margin. Discriminatory auctions contain
an element of surprise, as incumbents face a di¢ cult task when they trade o¤ the probability
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Table 4: E¢ ciency in % including external e¤ects
Discr. dummy
Ascending Discriminatory MW-test (Random E¤ects)
x = 0 Actual 85:6 10 :4 95:5 6 :7 p = 0:00 9:9 1 :9 p = 0:00
Nash preempt 100:0 0 :0 100:0 0 :0
Nash dem red 81:0 8 :9
x = 50 Actual 73:5 24 :1 82:8 22 :6 p = 0:03 9:3 3 :3 p = 0:01
Nash preempt 94:7 14 :3 94:4 14 :4
Nash dem red 58:1 24 :5
x = 100 Actual 45:5 68 :5 50:5 59 :9 p = 0:67 5:0 10 :9 p = 0:65
Nash preempt 83:3 52 :6 77:4 53 :8
Nash dem red 20:6 62 :5
Mann- x=0 vs x=50 p = 0:01 p = 0:00
Whitney x=50 vs x=100 p = 0:01 p = 0:00
x=0 vs x=100 p = 0:00 p = 0:00
Notes: Standard deviations in italics. The Mann-Whitney ranksum tests reported in the column
MW-testcompare the realized revenues for the ascending and discriminatory auctions using the 8
average observations per independent group as data. The nal three rows report the similar Mann-
Whitney test results for comparisons across di¤erent values of the externality x, for each auction
format separately. The nal column reports the signicance of the discriminatory auction dummy
variable in a regression with a random e¤ect term for the groups.
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of winning against the prot margin in case they win. There is, however, another argument in
the opposite direction. In ascending auctions there exists a demand reducing equilibrium even
when the entrant imposes negative external e¤ects on the incumbents. In such an equilibrium,
the newcomer enters independent of her private value for the licenses. Thus, ascending auctions
may stimulate entry, although perhaps for the wrong reasons.
Table 5 reports the frequencies of market entry together with the number of goods the
entrant obtains conditional on entry. This table does not include the treatments where external
e¤ects are absent, because when x = 0 bidders have symmetric roles. Comparing the two
auction formats, there is no di¤erence in the relative frequency with which entry occurs. This
holds both with a mild and a strong externality. Notice that in the ascending auctions, entry
levels are between the level predicted by the preemptive equilibrium and that predicted by the
demand reduction equilibrium (100%).22 In the discriminatory auctions the newcomer enters
more often than predicted. In both types of auctions entry levels do not vary with the level of
the external e¤ect.
Table 5 also shows that, conditional on entry, the entrant wins slightly fewer licenses in the
ascending auctions than in the discriminatory auctions. This observation is in line with the
frequent play of the demand reduction equilibrium in the ascending auctions. The di¤erences
in number of licenses bought fail to reach signicant levels however. The number of licenses
the entrant gets (conditional on entry) is also independent of the extent of the external e¤ect.
Result 3 summarizes the ndings on entry.
Result 3. Both the relative frequency of entry and the number of licenses the entrant buys
conditional on entry are independent of the auction format and the level of the negative exter-
nality.
Overall, the aggregate results reveal that the discriminatory auction is preferred or better, not
outperformed in terms of revenue, e¢ ciency, and entry. A plausible explanation for this is that
the demand reduction equilibrium has considerable drawing power in the ascending auction.
The aggregate results for this auction typically fall in between the theoretical predictions of the
demand reduction equilibrium and those of the preemptive equilibrium. In the discriminatory
auctions the aggregate results are fairly well in line with the theoretical predictions. The main
di¤erence is that entry occurs more frequently than predicted (cf. Table 5). This in turn
results in e¢ ciency levels that are somewhat lower than predicted (cf. Table 4). A potential
explanation for the surprisingly high frequencies of entry is that bidders do not submit the
at bidding schedules as predicted by the unique symmetric equilibrium. This allows for the
22Again note that the predictions appearing in Table 5 are based on the actual private value draws. For the
theoretical U [0; 100] distribution entry probabilities in the preemptive equilibria of the ascending auction equal
57:3% and 45:4% for x = 50 and x = 100; respectively (cf. Subsection 3.2). In the discriminatory auction these
numbers equal 61:0% and 55:3%.
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Table 5: Entry in %
Dummy Discr.
Ascending Discriminatory MW-test (Random e¤ects)
Entry
x = 50 Actual 83:6 37 :2 81:3 39 :2 p = 0:52  2:3 5 :4 p = 0:67
Nash preempt 60:2 49 :2 61:7 48 :8
Nash dem red 100:0 0 :0
x = 100 Actual 82:8 37 :9 85:2 35 :7 p = 0:48 2:3 8 :9 p = 0:79
Nash preempt 46:1 50 :0 57:8 49 :6
Nash dem red 100:0 0 :0
MW-test x=50 vs x=100 p = 0:83 p = 0:34
# goods entrant (given entry)
x = 50 Actual 2:14 0 :71 2:27 0 :86 p = 0:34 0:13 0 :13 p = 0:31
Nash preempt 3:0 0 :0 3:0 0 :0
Nash dem red 2:0 0 :0
x = 100 Actual 2:05 0 :77 2:34 0 :82 p = 0:14 0:29 0 :18 p = 0:11
Nash preempt 3:0 0 :0 3:0 0 :0
Nash dem red 2:0 0 :0
MW-test x=50 vs x=100 p = 0:56 p = 0:53
Notes: Standard deviations in italics. The Mann-Whitney ranksum tests reported in the column MW-
testcompare the realized revenues for the ascending and discriminatory auctions using the 8 average
observations per independent group as data. The nal row of each panel reports the similar Mann-
Whitney test results for comparisons across di¤erent values of the externality x, for each auction
format separately. The nal column reports the signicance of the discriminatory auction dummy
variable in a regression with a random e¤ect term for the groups.
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possibility that the entrant obtains 1 or 2 licenses, possibilities that will not materialize in the
symmetric Nash equilibrium. ln the next section we will come back to this aspect of the bidding
process.
4.2 Individual bidding and equilibrium selection
The individual bidding in periods 9-16 resembles the bidding in periods 1-8 to a large extent.
Therefore, we chose not to report on the time dimension of the data, except for the cases where
it does matter.
Recall from section 3.2 that in the discriminatory auction, all three bidders bid on all three
licenses in the unique symmetric equilibrium. In the absence of an externality, the optimal bid
functions are the same for the entrant and the incumbents:
B(v) =
v
3
300  2v
200  v

; (16)
where 0  v  100 denotes the per-license private value of the bidder.23 Figure 5 displays the
average observed bids in treatment disc0 together with the Nash prediction reected in (16).
The Nash bids trace the average of the second-highest bids remarkably well. The absolute
distance between the average of a bidders three submitted bids and the corresponding Nash
prediction is less than or equal to 3, 5 and 10 in respectively 39:8%, 59:9% and 86:4% of the
cases. So a large proportion of the average bids are close to the Nash predictions and there are
no systematic deviations in upward or downward direction.
[ Figure 5 about here ]
One aspect of observed bidding behavior that is not compatible with our theoretical predic-
tions is that subjects tend to submit di¤erent bids for identical units. The same nding shows
up in the discriminatory auction treatment of Engelmann and Grimm (2009). In fact, Figure
5 shows that the three bidding functions fan out for higher private values. A similar pattern
of fanning out is present in the discriminatory treatments with external e¤ects. In only 17:7%
of the cases without external e¤ects did the subjects submit exactly the same three bids. This
number increases a little to 19:3% in the treatment with x = 50 and to 22:1% in the treatment
with x = 100. A hedging motive may be responsible for bidderstendency to submit di¤erent
bids for identical licenses: with the high bid a bidder plays safe and makes it less likely that
she ends up without any prot. With the low bid the bidder then tries to hit the jackpot.
Figures 6 and 7 show the bidding patterns for the discriminatory auctions with x = 50 and
x = 100, respectively. In each of these gures we separated the bids of the incumbents and the
23Recall that in section 3 the units were scaled down by a factor of 1/100.
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entrants. We plotted the averages of subjects three submitted bids and the Nash predictions.
The most striking departure from the theoretical predictions is that low-value incumbents bid
too low. Theory predicts that when x = 50 all incumbents with v  13 should bid above their
value. In case x = 100 this applies to all types satisfying v  26. For example, when v = 0,
Nash incumbents should bid 50=6 when x = 50 and 100=6 when x = 100. In contrast to these
predictions, low-value incumbents are unwilling to bid above their values. Perhaps they wish to
avoid the worst-possible scenario in which they buy some licenses at prices above their values
while still having to bear the negative externality caused by entry. Such an explanation may
be compatible with the opposite deviation observed for high private values. Here incumbents
bid below value but higher than the Nash prediction. Quite possible they do this to enhance
the likelihood that the entrant is kept out.
Our theoretical analysis of the discriminatory auction with external e¤ects assumes that
incumbents employ the same strategy. To investigate the possibility of incumbent asymmetry,
we estimated for each of the 8 groups of disc50 and disc100 the following OLS regression:
bi;t = 0 + 1vi;t + 2v
2
i;t + k3 + k4vi;t + k5v
2
i;t + "i;t; (17)
where bi;t represents the average bid of incumbent i (i = 1; 2) in period t (t = 1:::16), k
represents a dummy that equals 0 when i = 1 and 1 when i = 2 and "i;t refers to the error
term that is independent across incumbents and periods. For each group, we used a Wald test
to test whether the restriction 3 = 4 = 5 = 0 is rejected at the 5% level. When x = 50 the
restriction is rejected in 4 of the 8 groups and when x = 100 in 3 of the 8 groups. In total,
incumbent symmetry is not rejected in a small majority of the groups.
The bidding behavior of the entrant is relatively closer to Nash. This is reected by the
relative frequency of bids close to the Nash predictions. In the treatment with weak external
e¤ects, 48:0% (82:7%) of the entrantsaverage bids are at most 5 (10) points away from the
Nash predictions, while only 35:3% (72:2%) of the incumbentsbids are within a range of 5
(10) points from the Nash bids. In the treatment with strong externalities, the pattern is the
same but the deviations are more pronounced. Here, 27:0% (60:7%) of the entrants average
bids di¤er at most 5 (10) points from the Nash predictions, while only 15:9% (32:7%) of the
incumbentsbids are within a range of 5 (10) points of the Nash bids.
[ Figures 6 and 7 about here ]
Theoretically, the introduction of an external e¤ect in the discriminatory auctions should
enhance the bids of both incumbents and entrants across the whole range of private values. The
e¤ect should be more pronounced for incumbents than for entrants. However, we do not observe
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any e¤ect when bidders draw private values below 50. Pooled across all cases where bidders
receive values below 50, they bid on average 11:7, 13:4 and 13:0 in the respective treatments
with x = 0, x = 50 and x = 100. Neither the incumbentsnor the entrantsbids vary with the
external e¤ect for low private values. In contrast, when bidders draw private values above 50,
their bids incorporate the external e¤ect. Compared with the average bid of 29:3 observed in
the absence of external e¤ects, incumbentsbids increase to 36:7 while entrantsbids remain at
30:8 when x = 50. When the external e¤ect is further enhanced to x = 100, incumbentsbids
increase a little further to 38:7, while now the entrantsbids jump to 39:6. Thus the results
suggest that the incumbents neglect the entrant when they have low private values, possibly
because they think that they cannot prevent entry of the newcomer anyway. When they have
high private values they are condent that their bids can make a di¤erence and they bid more
competitively than they do without external e¤ects.
We summarize our main ndings on bidding behavior in the discriminatory auctions in the
following result:
Result 4. Individual bidding behavior in the discriminatory auctions deviates from our equi-
librium predictions (cf. Subsection 3.2) in two important ways: (i) subjects tend to submit
di¤erent bids for identical units and (ii) in the presence of negative externalities low-value
incumbents bid too low.
Result 4 provides an explanation for our earlier observation that in the discriminatory auctions,
entry occurs more often than predicted. First, because incumbents and entrants do not submit
at bidding schedules, actual bidding allows for the possibility that the entrant obtains 1 or
2 licenses. This happens in 37:5% (37:2%) of the cases when x = 50 (x = 100). Second,
incumbents with low private values bid too low, also contributing to the higher frequencies of
entry.
We next turn to the ascending auctions. These auctions present bidders with a coordination
problem: do they split the market at low prices, thereby winning a moderate number of goods
at high prot margins, or do they decide to bid competitively in an attempt to drive out one
of their opponents? If each of the three subjects in a group starts bidding on two goods only,
then the clock does not even start rising and each of the bidders buys two goods at a price
of zero. In the experiments, bidders often reduce their demand in exactly this way. We also
observe many cases that are very close to this ideal versionof demand reduction. For instance,
there are cases where two of the three bidders start bidding on two goods while the third starts
bidding on three goods. The clock starts rising and at a very low price the third bidder stops
the clock by reducing her demand from three to two goods. Table 6 lists the perfect cases of
strategic demand reduction in the row labeled DR1, together with the close-to-perfect cases in
the rows DR2 and DR3.
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Demand reduction is supported in equilibrium by an assumption about what happens o¤
the equilibrium path. The theoretical analysis assumes that bidders should bid competitively
once they nd out that one of them greedily asks for 3 instead of 2 licenses. It turns out that
this assumption agrees quite well with how subjects behaved in the experiment. When we
focus on the ascending auctions where one bidder deviated from splitting the available licenses
equally (i.e., on cases where one of the bidders initially demanded 3 licenses while the other
2 bidders initially demanded 2 licenses each), the bidders who reduced their demand in vain
competed vigorously in the remainder of the auction by winning 2 units or by at least bidding
up to their value in 86.9% of the cases. When we restrict the attention to periods 9-16, the
relative frequency of competitive responses to cheating on demand reduction further increases
to 92.3%.
The second panel of Table 6 labeled Preemption + Competitiondepicts how often subjects
bid competitively or preemptively in a serious attempt to get rid of a competitor. For the
auctions without external e¤ects, competitive bidding means that the realized price will at
least be as high as the minimum private value in the group minus one. The three rows CO1,
CO2 and CO3 list these cases; these rows di¤er in the actual price that results. In the treatments
with external e¤ects, preemptive bidding requires that each incumbent starts bidding on three
goods, otherwise the external e¤ect cannot be prevented. An ideal example of preemptive
bidding occurs if the two incumbents successfully drive out the entrant by bidding above value
and thereby prevent the negative e¤ect. These cases are listed in the row PR. There are also
cases where the incumbents successfully worked out the entrant but did not have to bid above
value to do so. Such cases are consistent with preemptive bidding as well as with competitive
bidding and are listed in the row (PR+CO)1. Even in the preemptive equilibrium entrants
will sometimes enter the market if they have a su¢ ciently better private value than each of the
incumbents. So the class of preemption+competition contains a subclass where the newcomer
enters the market, despite the fact that each incumbent remained in the auction for three goods
until the clock reached at least her private value (see row (PR+CO)2). Among these cases we
have also included the close-to-perfectcases where the entrant made an unsuccessful attempt
to seduce the incumbents to collude by reducing her demand at a low price.
The percentages in Table 6 reveal that both demand reduction and competitive/preemptive
bidding are observed in all regimes. Without external e¤ects demand reduction is by far
the most frequently observed outcome. With external e¤ects the relative frequency of demand
reduction drops dramatically, but still remains the most observed outcome. Preemptive bidding
becomes more likely when the negative external e¤ect inicted by the entrant increases, but even
when x = 100 only 20:4% of the outcomes are characterized as competitive/preemptive bidding
(while 30:3% of the outcomes correspond to demand reduction). To get a clean estimate of
preemptive bidding, the % of competitive outcomes observed in the ascending auction without
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external e¤ect needs to be subtracted from the % of cases consistent with competitive and
preemptive bidding in the ascending auctions with external e¤ects. Thus, we nd that only
7:6% of the cases when x = 50 and 13:2% of the cases when x = 100 are true examples of
preemptive bidding.
The weak appeal of the preemptive bidding equilibrium might be related to the fact that
this equilibrium potentially results in the worst-case scenario for an incumbent. This happens
when she bids above her value on all three licenses while the other incumbent reduces demand
from three to zero licenses. In that case she has to bear the negative external e¤ect caused by
the entrant and at the same time pay higher prices for the licenses than they are worth. Loss
averse incumbents may only want to embark on the risky enterprise of preemptive/competitive
bidding if they feel su¢ ciently condent that they will succeed in beating the entrant.24 If this
reasoning is sound, then one would expect that incumbents only opt for preemption/competition
when they have a high private value. Figure 8 shows that this indeed appears to be a driving
force behind equilibrium selection. The gure considers only the outcomes that received the
labels preemption/competitionor demand reductionin Table 6. For both regimes x = 50
and x = 100 the gure shows the percentage of preemptive/competitive outcomes as function
of the minimum private value of the two incumbents. In both cases the demand reduction
equilibrium prevails when the minimum private value is low while the preemptive/competitive
outcome is dominant when this value is high. When the external e¤ect is weak, incumbents
pursue the preemptive/competitive outcome if both of them have a private value of at least
60.25 In case x = 100 incumbents already opt for the preemptive/competitive path if both of
them have private values higher than 40.
[ Figure 8 about here ]
There is an interesting pattern in the bidding of many of the experimental auction outcomes
that do not belong to the class of pure demand reduction or the class of pure preemption. With
negative external e¤ects, the incumbents often start bidding on three goods each, like they are
supposed to do in a preemptive bidding equilibrium. When it turns out that it is not possible
to drive out the entrant at low prices, the incumbents often reduce their demand well before
the clock has reached their private values. As a result, the entrant is able to enter the market
at a price below the minimum private value of the incumbents. These outcomes have the avor
of the cheap preemptiveequilibria with 0 < p < 1 derived in Subsection 3.1. Note, however,
24Ideally, one would like to identify a subjects loss-aversion in a di¤erent, unrelated task. We do not have
such data, however.
25Notice that rather counterintuitively the curve for x=50 bends downward for very high minimum private
values. However, this part of the gure is based on few data only.
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that these outcomes are also consistent with what Engelmann and Grimm (2009) call partial
demand reductionequilibria. In a setting without negative external e¤ects, they show that
bidders may reduce demand at prices above 0 but below their values. We include them at the
bottom of Table 6 in the row labeled (CP+PDR).26 To assess the net % of cheap preemptive
outcomes, we subtract the % of cases when x = 0 from the % of cases when x = 50 and x = 100.
This way, we nd that 14:0% of the cases in the regime with x = 50 and 10:8% of the cases in
the regime with x = 100 represent true cheap preemptive attempts.
Notice that there is a whole range of cheap preemptive equilibria which allows for the
possibility that the incumbents do not agree on the price level where they should reduce demand.
In fact, in only 23:5% of the cases reported in (CP+PDR), the incumbents reduced demand at
approximately the same price (measured as cases where the di¤erence in prices where demand
was reduced less than or equal to 2). Therefore, we prefer to refer to these cases as cheap
preemptive outcomes instead of cheap preemptive equilibria. We observe an approximately
equal number of cheap preemptive outcomes and preemptive cases. When faced with a stubborn
entrant, many incumbents chicken out and settle for an outcome that still gives them a positive
prot margin on the goods purchased.
Table 6 also reports the equilibrium selection results for periods 9-16 separately. The
results for the second part of the experiment shine light on the questions whether the relative
attractiveness of equilibria changes over time and whether subjects learn to play according
to equilibrium over time. The relative frequencies of the equilibria in the second part of the
experiment are by and large the same as the relative frequencies of the equilibria in the whole
experiment. Thus, the relative attractiveness of the equilibria does not appear to change. In
treatments x = 0 and x = 100, the relative frequency of outcomes in the Miscellaneous class
decreases over time. This suggests that subjects learned to play better in accordance with
equilibrium in the second part of the experiment. This learning e¤ect was not observed when
x = 50.
Our overall ndings on equilibrium selection are summarized in Result 5.
Result 5. (i) In the ascending auction strategic demand reduction is observed more often than
preemptive bidding, although the presence of negative externalities makes demand reduction
less focal. (ii) Around 10   15% of the observed outcomes can be classied as truly cheap
preemptive; incumbents rst try to get rid of the entrant at low prices, but then turn to
demand reduction when this appears unsuccessful.
26The row labeled PDR contains the corresponding cases for the situation without external e¤ects. Because
in that regime the preemptive motive is absent, these cases are labeled as partial demand reduction outcomes.
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5 Conclusion
When the ascending auction is employed to assign market licenses there often exist multiple
equilibria that di¤er sharply in terms of revenue and e¢ ciency. Which equilibrium is selected
is an empirical issue that likely depends on market conditions before and after the auction, e.g.
when incumbents compete with entrants for a limited set of licenses. At one extreme, there
is the demand reduction equilibrium where all bidders collude and strategically reduce their
demand at the lowest possible price. This way, each bidder cheaply obtains a (small) number of
licenses. At the other extreme, there is a preemptive equilibrium where incumbents engage in
predatory bidding to keep entrants out of the market. This way, incumbents avoid the negative
externality that arises when entrants compete in the post-auction market. In addition, there
are cheap preemptiveequilibria that unify the two extremes. In such equilibria, bidders rst
behave preemptively but when the entrant does not concede early enough they switch to the
demand reduction outcome. Like in the demand reduction equilibrium, all three bidders are
needed for a successful reduction of demand.
Given the multitude of equilibria, the e¤ectiveness of the ascending auction (in terms of
revenue, e¢ ciency, and entrantschances) crucially depends on which of these equilibria is most
likely selected. A practical and often used alternative is the sealed-bid discriminatory (pay-
your-bid) auction. This format has the advantage that it does not support demand reduction
and, hence, collusion among all bidders is excluded. At the same time, preemptive bidding
becomes more complicated as incumbents cannot track the behavior of other incumbents. Using
controlled laboratory experiments we compare the performance of the discriminatory auction
vis-a-vis the ascending auction.
In the experiments, demand reduction is always more common than the preemptive bidding
outcome in the ascending auction, which generates less revenue and is less e¢ cient than the
discriminatory auction. Both auction formats induce similar high levels of entry; they are high
in the ascending auction because of demand reduction and they are high in the discriminatory
auction because bidders place di¤erent bids for the three items. With an increase in the negative
external e¤ect, the dominance of the demand reduction equilibrium diminishes.
The bidding data of the ascending auction reveal an intuitive empirical equilibrium selection
device. Incumbents let their decision to pursue the demand reduction outcome depend on their
private value. With low private values they gure they have no chance to drive the entrant
out and they settle for demand reduction. With high private values they pursue preemption,
conditional on the cooperation of the other incumbent. The threshold above which subjects
opt for preemption decreases with the negative external e¤ect.
The data reveal that the ascending auction fairly often results in outcomes that are consis-
tent with cheap preemption. Incumbents rst try to keep the entrant out of the market but
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when this appears unsuccessful, they revert to demand reduction. This result suggests that the
outcome of the German UMTS auction is not as exceptional or irrational as it may have rst
appeared.
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Appendix A
Besides the on-screen instructions subjects also received a summary of these instructions on
paper. Below a direct translation of this summary sheet is given for both the asc50 and disc50
treatments.
Summary of the instructions Todays experiment consists of two parts. At the beginning
of part 1 you are assigned to a group of 3 participants. During the 15 rounds of part 1 the
group composition remains unchanged. The three participants within a group are labeled type
A, type B and type X. At the start of the experiment you will learn your type. You will keep
the same type during the complete rst part.
Products. Within each group there are in each round 6 identical products up for sale. For
each group member the value of each product lies in between 0 and 100 points, and every
integer number between 0 and 100 is equally likely. The value a particular group member has
is independent of the values of the other group members. At the start of a round you will only
learn your own value for each product. Your value of a product in one round does not depend
on your value of a product in any other round.
Bidding and prices. After you have learnt your value, you indicate on how many products
you would like to start bidding. You can start bidding on 0, 1, 2, or 3 products. We label
this amount your demanded quantity. If the sum of demanded quantities within a group is
smaller than or equal to 6, then each group member is assigned his/her demanded quantity and
pays a price of 0 points per product. The products that are possibly left over remain unsold.
In case the sum the demanded quantities exceeds 6, a thermometerstarts rising from 0
points onwards. The thermometer indicates the price. At every price each group member has
the opportunity to adapt the demanded quantity downwards. As soon as the sum of demanded
quantities equals 6, the thermometer stops. The position of the thermometer determines the
price that is paid for each product. All group members are assigned the number of products
they demand at the time the thermometer comes to a stop.
From the moment the thermometer starts rising, you can decrease your demand quantity
only such that the sum of the demand quantities remains larger than or equal to 6. In case
a participant lowers his/her demanded quantity during a round, the other group members are
informed immediately about this.
[In disc50: Bidding and prices. After you have learnt your value, you indicate for each of the
products how much you would like to bid for it. You can make a bid on three products at most.
A bid has to be in between 0 and 125 points. For each product you indicate how much you
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are willing to pay for it. You can decide yourself whether you make the same or di¤erent bids.
You can also decide not to make a bid on one or more products.
After every group member has made his/her bids, the six products are assigned to the 6
highest bids. In case there are less than 6 bids in total, the products are assigned to all the
bids that are made. The remaining products remain unsold. In case a product is assigned to
you, your bid determines the price you pay for this product.]
Earnings. Your returns are equal the number of products that you buy multiplied by the
di¤erence between the value assigned to each of your products and the price you pay for each
product:
Your returns = number of products  (your value  the price)
[In disc50: Earnings. For each product that you bought your returns are equal the di¤erence
between the value of the product and the price you pay for this product. Your overall returns
equal the sum of the returns per product purchased. For example, if you buy 3 products, then
your returns are equal to:
Your returns = (your value   the price of 1st product you bought) +
(your value   the price of 2nd product you bought) +
(your value   the price of 3rd product you bought) ]
If you are a participant with type X, then your earnings within a round equal your returns.
In case you have either type A or type B, your earnings also depend on whether type X bought
any products or not. If type X has bought one or more products, then the returns of both type
A and type B are in that round reduced with 50 points. Only when type X buys no products
at all there is no reduction on the returns of types A and B in that round.
At the beginning of part 1 you receive a starting capital of 750 points. Your total number
of points at the end of part 1 will be equal to the sum of this starting capital and your earnings
in all 15 rounds. At the end of the experiment your points are exchanged into euros. Here it
holds that 80 points correspond with 1 euro in money. Part 1 starts with a practice round.
Your prots or losses during this practice round are not counted.
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Figure 1: Incum
bents’ bidding behavior in the ascending auction 
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Figure 2: Revenue histograms when x = 0 
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Notes: For every revenue level the % of outcomes that fall in the interval 
[revenue−10,revenue+10] is displayed. 
Figure 3: Revenue histograms when x = 50 
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Notes: For every revenue level the % of outcomes that fall in the interval 
[revenue−10,revenue+10] is displayed. 
Figure 4: Revenue histograms when x = 100 
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Notes: For every revenue level the % of outcomes that fall in the interval 
[revenue−10,revenue+10] is displayed. 
Figure 5: Bidding behavior in the discriminatory auction with x = 0 
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Notes: Bid 1 graphs the average highest bids submitted as function of 
the values. Likewise, bid 2 and bid 3 show the middle highest bids and 
the lowest bids respectively. For every value the average of bids in the 
interval [value−2, value+2] is reported. 
Figure 6: Bidding behavior in the discriminatory auction with x = 50 
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Notes: Bid inc (bid entr) graphs the average of the three bids submitted 
by incumbents (entrants) as function of value. For every value the 
average of bids in the interval [value−2, value+2] is reported. Nash inc 
(Nash entr) shows the Nash bids of incumbents (entrants) of value. 
Figure 7: Bidding behavior in the discriminatory auction with x = 100 
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Notes: Bid inc (bid entr) graphs the average of the three bids submitted 
by incumbents (entrants) as function of value. For every value the 
average of bids in the interval [value−2, value+2] is reported. Nash inc 
(Nash entr) shows the Nash bids of incumbents (entrants) of value. 
 
Figure 8: Preemptive/competitive bidding versus demand reduction 
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Notes: For every minimum value of the incumbents the % of 
preemptive/competitive outcomes in the interval [minimum value 
incumbents−4, minimum value incumbents+4] is reported. The relative 
frequency of demand reduction outcomes equals 100% − the % of 
preemptive outcomes. 
 
 
